Evaluating a patient's request for life-prolonging treatment: an ethical framework by Winkler, Eva C. et al.
PAPER
Evaluating a patient’s request for life-prolonging
treatment: an ethical framework
Eva C Winkler,1 Wolfgang Hiddemann,2 Georg Marckmann3
ABSTRACT
Contrary to the widespread concern about over-
treatment at the end of life, today, patient preferences
for palliative care at the end of life are frequently
respected. However, ethically challenging situations in
the current healthcare climate are, instead, situations in
which a competent patient requests active treatment
with the goal of life-prolongation while the physician
suggests best supportive care only. The argument of
futility has often been used to justify unilateral
decisions made by physicians to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining treatment. However, we argue that
neither the concept of futility nor that of patient
autonomy alone is apt for resolving situations in which
physicians are confronted with patients’ requests for
active treatment. Instead, we integrate the relevant
arguments that have been put forward in the academic
discussion about ‘futile’ treatment into an ethical
algorithm with five guiding questions: (1) Is there
a chance that medical intervention will be effective in
achieving the patient’s treatment goal? (2) How does
the physician evaluate the expected benefit and the
potential harm of the treatment? (3) Does the patient
understand his or her medical situation? (4) Does the
patient prefer receiving treatment after evaluating the
benefit-harm ratio and the costs? (5) Does the
treatment require many resources? This algorithm shall
facilitate approaching patients’ requests for treatments
deemed futile by the physician in a systematic way,
and responding to these requests in an ethically
appropriate manner. It thereby adds substantive
considerations to the current procedural approaches of
conflict resolution in order to improve decision making
among physicians, patients and families.
BACKGROUND
Empirical studies indicate that decisions to limit
life-prolonging treatment precede up to two-
thirds of all non-sudden hospital deaths in
Western countries.1 The most recent European
studies show that physicians inform less than half
their patients about their decisions to forgo
certain treatments.2 3 While physicians frequently
share decisions to limit life-prolonging treatment
with patients who prefer comfort care, they often
do not inform patients who request life-
prolonging treatment.3 In a US study conducted in
1995, 80% of physicians reported unilaterally
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treat-
ment that they considered futile, sometimes
without the knowledge or consent of the patient,
and sometimes regardless of the patient’s objec-
tions.4 There is considerable controversy about the
circumstances in which a physician may legiti-
mately decide on behalf of a competent, critically
ill patient without consent, or even without
notifying the patient. ‘Medical futility ’ is
a common justification that is used when physi-
cians decide against life-prolonging interventions
without informing the patient. The concept of
futility emerged in the 1980s as an attempt to
objectively define what constitutes treatments
that physicians are not obliged to provide. It soon
became clear, however, that the meaning of
‘futility ’ is ambiguous, since the term confounds
morally distinct cases. Futility may refer to
treatments that are not going to work at all, for
example, defibrillating an asystolic patient (phys-
iological futility). The term ‘futility ’ is also used
for effective treatments that the physician may
consider inappropriate because they have an
unfavourable benefit-harm ratio, for example,
treating a patient with an aggressive chemo-
therapy with only marginal benefit and severe side
effects (qualitative futility). In the first case, the
physician is not obliged to offer the treatment or
to seek patient consent for withdrawal, since
ineffective treatments lie outside of standard
medical care.5 Yet, in the second case, simply
calling a treatment futile obscures the underlying
value disagreement about the legitimate ends of
medical treatment and the fact that the patient
and the physician may assess the benefit-to-harm
ratio differently. Therefore, the concept of futility
is not sufficiently robust to meet the ethical and
clinical demands of being an aid to decision.6
Critics of the concept of futility urged a move
away from a substantive definition of futility.7
Instead, they recommended a procedural approach
that supports sound decision making, that is able
to mediate between the two parties who hold
diverging positions.8e11 Procedures that attempt
to resolve disputes over futility include policies
that have been adopted by a number of hospitals
in the US and that have been endorsed by the
American Medical Association, as well as case
discussions and mediation within hospital ethics
committees.9 While procedural approaches ideally
ensure that every voice is heard, thereby arriving
at a consensus about the right decision, they have
been criticised for being prone to support the
hospital’s interests10 and not being transparent on
the grounds of their decisionsdthey may, for
example, not adequately distinguish between
futility and rationing.12 Since ethics support
services have some experience with mediating
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conflicts, they have been called upon for resolving disagree-
ments about futile treatment. However, in many situations
when conflicts about futile treatment arise, there is insufficient
ethical support either because it is not offered by the institu-
tion or not utilised by the providers. Even with a defined
process for conflict resolution, inevitably, decisions must rely
on some set of criteria for action. Therefore, the ethical
framework we propose can either supplement procedural
approaches for conflict resolution or help the individual clini-
cian in responding to patients’ requests for ‘inappropriate’
treatments. We hope that the utility of this conceptual
framework will be that it combines the relevant ethical argu-
ments in a structured way, thereby guiding the persons
involved through the decision process. The evaluation of this
algorithm in routine clinical care is planned as a second step.
Five guiding questions to approach conflicts about limiting
treatment
Decisions about medical treatments require both medical
expertise and value judgements. Therefore, a dissent between
patient and physician about what is the best course of action
can result either from medical (factual) or normative (evalua-
tive) aspects of the decision. One main goal of this article is to
distinguish these two dimensions and to propose practical
criteria that can guide decisions about patients’ requests for life-
prolonging treatments. These criteria are: the expected effec-
tiveness of the intervention in question, the benefit-harm
ratio of the intervention, and the patient’s understanding
of his or her medical situation. Under conditions of scarcity,
resources required for the treatment may also play a role in
the decision, especially if the treatment has a low likelihood of
success or an unfavourable benefit-risk ratio. These criteria need
careful evaluation and are therefore built into an ethical decision
model with five guiding questions. The starting point is a situ-
ation in which a competent patient requests a treatment that
might be perceived as inappropriate by the healthcare team
(figure 1). We do not include proxy requests for incompetent
patients because surrogate decision making requires other ethical
considerations and decision processes. However, the family is
often involved in the patient’s decision-making process and is,
therefore, considered throughout the decision pathway.
1. Is there a chance that medical intervention will be effective in
achieving the patient’s treatment goal?
In general, medical decisions should be based on broad goals of
care and the patient shoulddwith the physician’s supportdplay
a key role in determining what those goals shall be. Therefore,
the treatment under consideration has to be evaluated with
regard to its ability to achieve the patient’s treatment goal.
Whether the treatment goal should be a cure, prolonging life or
comfort care needs to be negotiated between the patient, family
and the provider, and might change over the course of the disease.
Offering treatment that is ineffective with respect to a certain
treatment goal violates the rules of good clinical practice.
However, in practice, predicting the outcome of an intervention
can be difficult, because general success rates in defined study
populations do not allow for prediction with certainty about the
effectiveness in the specific medical situation of an individual
patient. Furthermore, effectiveness as a criterion provides an
incentive for setting a statistical threshold, as most treatments
are effective only in a certain percentage of cases. Schneiderman
et al suggested that physicians should not offer a treatment if
empirical data shows that the treatment had a <1 in 100 chance
of benefiting the patient.14 Apart from the difficulties in breaking
down the statistics to individual patients and their individual risk
profiles, this threshold might not be accepted by a substantial
portion of patients who think that a 1% chance of success is still
better than having no chance at all.15
Nevertheless, it is still an important first step to separate the
rare cases (in which the treatment will be ineffective) from those
cases in which success might be against the odds, but not
entirely impossible. In the former case, an intervention can be
ineffective either because a treatment does not work physio-
logically for the stated purpose, or has already proven to be
ineffective in the individual patient.16 An example is a patient’s
request for continuing a chemotherapy regimen during which
tumour growth was excessive, even though continuing the
chemotherapy would neither prolong the patient’s life nor
relieve tumour-related symptoms (physiological futility). If
there is no chance that the requested intervention will achieve
the patient’s treatment goal, the physician should not offer the
intervention. Instead, the physician should initiate a discussion
with the patient and the family about alternative and more
realistic treatment goals. This requires that the patient receives
full and open information about his or her medical situation and
the prognosis according to different treatment options. It is
often observed that, over time, patients tend to adjust their
unrealistic treatment goals.17
2. How does the physician evaluate the benefit-harm ratio of the
treatment?
If there is a chance that the requested treatment will achieve the
patient’s treatment goal, then the ethical obligations of benefi-
cence and non-maleficence require that the physician initially
evaluates the benefit-harm ratio independently of the patient’s
wishes. This evaluation demands not only medical expertise, but
also value judgements about acceptable benefits and harms.
Based on this evaluation, the physician can then enter into
further discussions with the patient about treatment goals and
the benefits and harms of different interventions from the
patient’s perspective.
While in theory the benefit-harm ratio is a continuous variable
ranging from a clear net benefit to a clear net harm, it seems
helpful for our purposes to distinguish three different proto-
typical situations that have important implications for further
steps in evaluating the patient’s request for a certain treatment
(see figure 1, question 2):
(A) Benefit > harm: If the benefits outweigh the potential harm,
the physician should offer the treatment requested by
the patient, even if the net benefit is small. In this case, the
physician’s beneficence-based obligations converge with the
patient’s preferences. An example could be a therapy with
moderate side effects that might prolong the patient’s life for
another 2 weeks.
(B) Benefit ¼ harm: There are cases in which benefits and harms
seem to be in balance, either because the expected benefit is not
very likely to be realised or because the harms counterbalance
the benefits.
(C) Harm > benefit: The harms exceed the expected benefits of
the intervention. This would be the case, for example, if
a patient with progressive cancer disease under third-line
chemotherapy wanted to switch to another chemotherapy
regimen with considerable toxicity or risk of immunosuppres-
sion, in which the new regimen is very unlikely to change the
course of the disease (qualitative futility).
In the last case (C) there is a conflict (and in the second case at
least a tension) between the physician’s obligation to respect
patient autonomy on the one hand, and the physician’s
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obligations of beneficence and non-maleficence on the other
hand. How can the physician respond to this conflict? First,
identifying the source of the dissent will help the physician to
understand why the patient prefers active treatment.
3. Does the patient assess his or her medical situation in a realistic
way?
The source of the dissent between physician and patient about
what is the best course of treatment can either be located on
a factual level (understanding of the medical situation) or on
a normative level (balancing benefits and burdens). If the patient
has a realistic understanding of the medical situation, the
physician should enter into a deliberation with the patient about
appropriate treatment goals and the benefits, risks and costs of
the different treatment options (see question 4).
There are two main reasons why patients may not assess their
medical situation in a realistic way: insufficient information or
denial. Patients are often not well informed about their situation
and tend to see their prognosis in overly optimistic terms.18
Reasons for this misunderstanding certainly can be that physi-
cians overestimate survival, fail to explicitly explain the prog-
nosis or palliative goal of the treatment, or do not involve
patients in decisions on limiting treatment.3 19 20 The physician
should, therefore, explain the situation, provide prognostic
information and psychological support to enable the patient to
develop a more realistic understanding of his or her situation.
In some cases, however, the unrealistic assessment of the
situation is a consequence of a denial reaction by the patient.3 To
date, the definitions of denial lack consensus as to whether
denial is unconscious or conscious, whether it is a state or a trait,
and whether it is a pathological mechanism of ineffective self-
defence or an adaptive strategy to protect oneself against over-
whelming events and feelings.21 Still, all concepts imply that
a coping strategy of denial leads to an inaccurate assessment
Figure 1 Systematic ethical decision
model with five guiding questions for
situations in which patients request
a treatment that might be perceived as
inappropriate by the healthcare team
(see explanation of the guiding
questions in the text). *Implementing
this last step of considerations requires
a broader societal consensus about the
physician’s role in making resource-
sensitive decisions at the bedside.
Figure reprinted from Winkler et al.13
Copyright (2011), with permission from
Elsevier.
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with respect to feasible treatment goals. Certainly, many
patients become better at coping with their diseasedoftentimes
with the support of psychological or palliative care consults.22
However, the more the harms of an intervention outweigh its
benefits, the higher are the demands on patients’ informed
understanding of their situation. We therefore suggest two
different strategies depending on the physician’s benefit-harm
evaluation, if the patient is in persistent denial despite coun-
selling and psychological support.
(A) If the patient runs the risk of having his or her denial cause
more harm than good, the physician has good reasons to give the
beneficence-based obligations priority over the patient’s wishes,
which will justify a unilateral decision not to offer the requested
treatment. It is one of the physician’s primary obligations to
protect patients from burdensome and potentially harmful
decisions that are not based on a realistic understanding of the
situationdand which the patients might regret afterwards
when they realise that it was based on false hopes. We are aware
that the denial argument may be abused to ignore the patient’s
wishes because they deviate from the physician’s recommenda-
tion. It is therefore important for a psychologist or psycho-
oncologist, who is experienced in assessing coping behaviours
and defence mechanisms, to evaluate the denial. This evaluation
is often based on whether the patient can or cannot address his
or her need for the denial of the informed understanding.23 In
addition, it can be helpful to involve the family in order to learn
about the patient’s hopes and values. With this information, the
physician might succeed in developing goals with the patient in
the near future that can realistically be achieved.
(B) If the patient is in denial, and harms and benefits are just
about balancedd according to the physician’s judgementdthe
beneficence-based obligations to withhold the requested treat-
ment are not as strong. Therefore, the physician has more
discretion whether he complies with the patient’s wishes for
active treatment or not. In this situation, it seems ethically
legitimate to take the cost of care into consideration (elaborated
in question 5).
4. Does the patient prefer treatment after evaluating the benefit-harm
ratio?
If the patient can assess his or her situation in a realistic way the
physician should explain their own benefit-harm assessment (see
question 2). The physician should empower the patient to not
simply follow unexamined preferences, but instead to make
a well-informed decision that is coherent with the patient’s
values and preferences. Whether the low odds of the benefits
justify a trial of treatment, or whether an effect counts as
a genuine benefit, involves value judgements. Studies show that
a person’s assessment of treatment options change as the
person’s health deteriorates: patients with advanced diseases are
much more likely to opt for burdensome treatment with
a minimal chance of benefit than healthy people would,
including medical and nursing professionals.24e26 Engaging in
a joint deliberation about the worthiness of health-related values
and outcomes (a deliberative model of the physicianepatient
relationship27) shall enhance patient autonomy: If the patient
still prefers the requested intervention after this deliberation, the
physician has good reasons to comply with the patient’s wishes.
However, if the intervention requires a lot of resources (either
financial or personal), the physician should inform the patient
about the resource consumption of different treatment options,
so that resource consumption can become part of the patient’s
deliberation.
5. Is resource consumption relevant to the decision?
All healthcare systems face the challenge of increasing demands
for healthcare within limited financial budgets. Assuming that
setting limits is inevitable, an explicit, rule-based rationing
process is preferable to implicit, case-based rationing at the
bedside.28 Still, even the best consensus-based rationing guide-
lines will not be able to completely eliminate bedside rationing,
since guidelines will never cover all medical areas and will have
to be interpreted and applied to each individual case. Actually,
some discretion appears to be desirable, for it allows the physi-
cian to do justice to the particularities of individual cases.29
It therefore seems ethically mandated to consider the required
resources in medical decision makingdto protect the resources
of the individual, third-party payers or the community from ill-
founded spending. While it is uncontroversial that physicians
should always minimise costs while realising the goal of care, it
is debated on what grounds patients and physicians should
refrain from costly treatments that might result in only
a minimal benefit for the patient.30e32 Here, we delineate situ-
ations in which autonomy-based reasons prevail (A, below) from
those in which cost considerations could play a decisive role in
the decision (B, below).
(A) If a patient with a realistic understanding of the medical
situation requests a treatment thatdin the physician’s
judgementdhas a questionable or nil net benefit, the physician
should inform the patient that everybody in the healthcare
system bears some responsibility for cost-sensitive decisions.
The physician should point out to the patient that the requested
treatment does provide only a small or no net benefit in this
situation, and a lot of resources could be saved if the patient
would not insist on the treatment. As a result, competent
patients are invited to factor costs into their deliberations,
however, they should ultimately be free to opt for the expensive
treatment strategy. Hence, in this case, sound autonomy-based
reasons take precedence over cost considerations at the bedside.
(B) If patients lack a realistic understanding of their medical
situation, and the benefit-harm ratio of the treatment is neither
clearly positive nor clearly negative, however, the required
resources could play a decisive role. As long as the treatment is
inexpensive, the physician may offer it, even if it provides
a questionable benefit. However, if the treatment draws heavily
on the resource pool (financial, material or staff), cost
considerations may justify a unilateral decision to withhold
the requested treatment since resource consumption is counter-
balanced against neither a clear net benefit nor by sound
autonomy-based reasons on behalf of the patient.
It is controversial whether clinicians should inform their
patients when they withhold interventions based on cost
considerations, and we also acknowledge that healthcare
systems differ when speaking of the cost of care, especially with
respect to different cultures. For example, physicians in Europe
report that they did ration health services on the basis of some
small expected benefit, low chances of success and low quality of
life.33 Problematically, it is often done in a covert and unpre-
dictable manner. A more explicit process, like the one proposed
here, contributes to the transparency of the underlying reasons
of a decision against treatment, and to the patients’ awareness
about the costs of the requested care. In the long run, physicians
should establish a ‘culture’ of responsibly discussing cost issues
with their patients.34 However, implementing this last step of
considerations requires a broader societal consensus about the
physician’s role in making resource-sensitive decisions at the
bedside.
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CONCLUSION
This decision model contributes substantive criteria for
a systematic deliberation in cases in which patients request
treatments that are perceived as ‘inappropriate’ by the health-
care team. The model is intended to honour the medical facts,
the patient’s autonomy and the clinical experience that ‘inap-
propriate’ treatments are often requested by patients in denial. It
integrates the relevant arguments that have been put forward in
the discussion about futile care.
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